Accounting Regulation and Management Discretion in a British Building Society, Circa 1960 by Batiz-Lazo, Bernardo & Billings, Mark
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Accounting Regulation and Management
Discretion in a British Building Society,
Circa 1960
Bernardo Batiz-Lazo and Mark Billings
University of Leicester, University of Nottingham, UK
May 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18805/
MPRA Paper No. 18805, posted 22. November 2009 23:44 UTC
 BERNARDO BÁTIZ-LAZO AND MARK BILLINGS 
*
 
Accounting Regulation and Management Discretion in a British Building 
Society, Circa 1960 
                                                 
*
 BERNARDO BÁTIZ-LAZO (b.batiz-lazo@leicester.ac.uk) is Senior Lecturer in 
Business and Accounting History, School of Management, Ken Edwards Building, 
University of Leicester, Leicester, LE1 7RH, England (Tel +44(0) 116 252 5647; fax  
+44(0) 116 252 5515); MARK BILLINGS (mark.billings@nottingham.ac.uk, 
corresponding author) is Lecturer in Accounting and Risk, Nottingham University 
Business School, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, Nottingham, NG8 1BB, England 
(Tel: +44(0) 115 846 6362; fax: +44(0) 115 846 6667).  The authors gratefully 
acknowledge most helpful and very detailed comments from Robert Luther, and 
suggestions from anonymous referees, Tony Arnold, David Barnes, Roy Chandler, 
Graeme Dean, Bernd Hayo, Masayoshi Noguchi, Janette Rutterford, Alan Sangster, 
Peter Scott, Peter Taylor, Peter Walton and participants at the 17
th
 Annual ABFH 
Conference (Cardiff, 2004), 19
th
 BAM Conference (Oxford,  2005), 11
th
 World 
Congress of Accounting Historians (Nantes, 2006), and staff seminars at Bristol 
Business School, Marburg University, Nottingham University Business School, and 
the University of Liverpool.  We thank Simon Rex (Building Societies Association), 
the National Archives and the archive section of the Nationwide Building Society.  
An anonymous and abridged version of this paper was published as a teaching case 
study (Ethics of Accounting) by the Open University Business School.  The usual 
caveats apply. 
 2 
MAY 2009 
Accounting Regulation and Management Discretion in a British 
Building Society, Circa 1960 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the manipulation of published financial reports in order to 
counter the potentially unfavourable impact of newly introduced regulation.  In this 
case the reported capital ratio of a major building society was enhanced using a sale 
and leaseback transaction with a related party and a change in depreciation policy, 
methods which reflected limited alternatives.  Analysis of the case is set in the context 
of the mid-term performance of the building society sector and addresses the 
questions of whether the manipulations involved were within then-prevailing 
generally accepted accounting principles and why, despite disclosure in the society‟s 
financial statements, these failed to attract public comment or concern, regulatory 
action or an audit qualification. In examining a major British mutual financial 
organisation we depart from traditional analyses of managerial discretion in 
accounting choices in manufacturing, mining and transport companies prior to the 
watershed Companies Act 1948.  
Key words: Accounting manipulation; Creative accounting; Sale and leaseback; 
Depreciation; Building societies; United Kingdom. 
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 This article investigates the response of a U.K. financial intermediary when 
regulatory change threatened to curtail its growth opportunities. The evolving inter-
relationships between strategic decision-making, regulation and accounting practices 
are central to our analysis of this case.  The key explanation of how and why those 
practices emerged in their historical context is managerial concern about the effects of 
changed regulatory requirements on stakeholder evaluation of the entity‟s 
performance. 
Building societies are mutual organizations, owned by their members who are 
their customers - borrowers and depositors with ownership rights - described as 
„shareholders‟. There were 819 societies in 1950, although 10 per cent of these 
accounted for about 50 per cent of the total assets of the „movement‟ (i.e. the building 
society sector).   Among the large societies, a handful had transformed themselves 
from the typical small and local organizations into large national ones.  This paper 
focuses on one such society, the Co-operative Permanent Building Society (hereafter 
the CPBS or the Society), whose rapid growth was driven both by amalgamations 
with other societies and organic growth.  By the end of the 1950s this growth had left 
the CPBS with a strategic problem: a weakened capital position when explicit 
statutory capital and liquidity requirements were first imposed on societies, which had 
finally won a long-running argument that trustees should be allowed to invest in their 
deposits. 
The paper addresses the question of how the CPBS, from an unpromising 
position, secured compliance with this new regulation when failure to meet the new 
capital requirements might have threatened the Society‟s status.  There are two 
aspects to our discussion: the creative accounting solutions used and the acquiescence 
of various stakeholder groups in their use. The CPBS entered into transactions which 
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may be regarded as „creative accounting‟ in that they appeared to comply with the 
relevant regulation and prevailing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 
but had a material positive impact on the Society‟s reported financial position.  The 
aggregate effect of these changes was clearly disclosed in the financial statements but 
failed to attract public comment from the auditors, the regulator, other societies or the 
press. 
This article constitutes a compelling story for several reasons. First, we focus on 
one large institution, providing a rich account of the business strategy and operations 
typical of a large society.  Little has been written about the business and accounting 
history of individual building societies, although the twentieth century history and 
performance of the building society movement in transforming retail deposits and 
„share‟ investments into long-term mortgage financing for domestic house purchases 
has been well-documented (see, e.g., Davies, 1981; Boléat, 1986; McKillop and 
Ferguson, 1993; Jeremy, 1998; Bátiz-Lazo, 2004).   
Second, this article examines an otherwise neglected area in the history of 
financial reporting, providing a detailed case study of „creative accounting‟ in an 
industry and period not known for manipulative activity, and in an organization which 
survived and was not subject to investigation.  Stolowy and Breton (2004, p. 6) 
describe „creative accounting‟ as a journalistic term that represents the exercise of 
management‟s discretion to make accounting choices or design transactions so as to 
modify apparent performance and enable transfers between the company and society 
(political costs), fund providers (cost of capital) or managers (compensation plans). 
The potential impact of these transactions will depend on the market context (Stolowy 
and Breton, 2004, p. 10). Much of the extant work on „creative accounting‟ in Britain 
focuses on manufacturing, transport and mining companies and generally examines 
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time periods before the „watershed‟ Companies Act 1948 (CA48) (e.g., Napier, 1990, 
1991; Arnold, 1991).  Such studies pay close attention to the links between improved 
disclosure, fixed asset accounting, inner or secret reserve accounting and „profit 
smoothing‟, and help to legitimize the rationale for the major changes in financial 
reporting requirements in CA48 (Arnold, 1997; Maltby, 2000). Arnold and Matthews 
(2002) and Arnold and Collier (2007) have demonstrated the impact of CA48 on 
corporate financial reporting.  Banks, together with certain other types of company, 
enjoyed significant exemptions from this Act, with considerable impact on their 
financial reporting (Billings and Capie, 2009).  But building societies, outside the 
scope of CA48 as mutual organizations, have not been subject to similar examination 
and had less opportunity to hold „hidden reserves‟.  Indeed, the CPBS case is unusual 
in that the accounting manipulations were clearly reflected in the Society‟s published 
financial statements, but failed to arouse public interest. 
Third, this article responds to the call by Stolowy and Breton (2004, p. 29) for 
more research on the motivations for manipulating accounts.  We argue that the 
motivation in this instance was the desire to avoid an adverse regulatory outcome.  
The case can therefore also be placed in the context of the so-called „bond covenant 
hypothesis‟ (Clinch, 1983, p. 141), whereby managers will wish to avoid the costs of 
violating restrictions, in this instance, the possible loss of a particular regulatory 
status. 
The article proceeds as follows.  The next section explains financial reporting 
and regulatory requirements for building societies and how these changed in 1959 and 
1960.  We then briefly describe the history of the CPBS and detail the business 
environment in which large building societies operated at the end of the 1950s.  The 
next section shows how the CPBS responded to changes in the regulatory and 
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business environment.  The penultimate section discusses this response and the 
position of various stakeholder groups: other societies; the regulator; the CPBS‟s 
directors; and its auditors.  The final section concludes. 
 
THE CHANGING REGULATION OF BUILDING SOCIETIES 
 
The Housing and House Purchase Act 1959 
The Building Societies Act 1894 (BSA94) gave powers to the Chief Registrar of 
Friendly Societies (CRFS) to intervene in the affairs of societies and required full 
accounting disclosure and professional audits (Phillips, 1983, p. 4). Although 
subsequently amended, notably in the Building Societies Act 1940, BSA94 remained 
the main statute regulating U.K. societies until changes introduced in 1959 and 1960. 
Following the enactment of the Housing and House Purchase Act 1959 
(HHPA59), societies gained two forms of government recognition: „their deposits 
became authorized trustee investments and building societies became entitled, for the 
first time in their long history, to borrow from H. M. Government‟.1  A 1954 
voluntary agreement had channelled £100 million from government through the 
societies to promote home ownership, but disadvantaged borrowers who wanted to 
buy a house built before 1919 (Registry of Friendly Societies (RFS), 1961, pp. 13-14; 
RFS, 1962, p. 357; Cleary, 1965; Boddy, 1980, pp. 17-19; Boléat, 1981, p. 153).
2
   To 
continue to „help people with moderate incomes … to fulfil their ambition of 
becoming home-owners‟,3 the government proposed making further advances through 
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societies, which agreed to take on the business in return for the designation of their 
deposits as suitable for investment by trustees.
4
 
„Trustee investment status‟ was first sought by societies for investments in 
their „shares‟ and deposits in the mid-1920s (Humphries, 1987, p. 335).  Without it, 
trustees, including executors of estates of the deceased, were unable to invest in 
building societies in the absence of specific directions. Societies believed that this 
status would give them a competitive advantage and increase their loanable resources
5
 
but it rapidly turned into „a seal of respectability … and all but a very few societies 
eligible for have sought and obtained such status‟ (Boléat, 1981, p. 32).  Designated 
status had been achieved by 218 of the 732 registered societies in December 1960, 
whose assets of £2,994 million comprised 94 per cent of the total assets of all 
registered societies (RFS, 1961, p. 6). By December 1961 there were 255 designated 
societies, whose assets totalled £3,274 million, 95.3 per cent of the assets of all 
registered societies (RFS, 1962, p. 5).  
  Initial qualification for, or revocation of, trustee investment status was at the 
discretion of the CRFS (RFS, 1961, p. 7), with no requirement for automatic 
revocation when a society ceased to fulfil the requirements of the HHPA59.  A later 
Statutory Instrument required that a society should have a minimum net reserve ratio 
(of 2.5 per cent of net assets at the end of 1960) and a minimum liquidity requirement 
(of 7.5 per cent of total assets at the end of 1960) to be granted this status (S.I. 1959 
No. 1010).  The Building Societies Association (BSA), the voluntary industry body, 
adopted these same requirements as a condition for renewal of membership, but did 
not require compliance until 1965, to allow smaller and less liquid societies time to 
meet them. The BSA‟s move was intended to give „… the public the same guarantee 
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of security in the case of deposits and investments in smaller societies, [as] trustee 
status gave to the larger societies‟ (Cleary, 1965, p. 268). 
Meeting the liquidity requirement was straightforward for most societies - for 
the sector as a whole cash and investments had exceeded 14 per cent of total assets for 
every year since 1945 (Cleary, 1965, p. 256) and were to remain above 15 per cent 
until at least 1973 (Greer, 1974, p. 11).  The „normal‟ range for liquidity ratios for 
individual societies within any one year was between 12 and 22 per cent (Perks, 1977, 
p. 62).  Meeting the reserve requirement, however, was more challenging.  Just as 
capital adequacy sustains confidence in banks, building societies need reserves to 
provide against various contingencies to maintain investor confidence: losses on the 
sale of mortgaged properties following borrower default; losses on the realization of 
investments in (mainly fixed income) securities; and to guard against the unknown.
6
  
Before the HHPA59, the BSA had long recommended that every society should aim 
for „gross‟ (i.e. a less strictly defined level of) reserves of at least 5 per cent of total 
assets. In 1938 the average figure for all societies was 5.5 per cent and had fallen to 
4.5 per cent by 1957, but this „decline in the [gross] reserve ratio was not in itself 
regarded as serious‟ by the BSA.7 The average gross reserve ratio for the major 
societies had dropped from 5.0 per cent in 1950 to 3.8 per cent in 1959 (Table 1, 
Panel A).   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
In 1959 Sir Cecil Crabbe, CRFS, noted that some societies had increased their 
general reserves by abandoning the practice of making provisions for future liabilities.  
He also noted that some societies had revalued their office premises to increase 
general reserves, but such revaluations were disregarded in the assessment for 
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designation, unless the society intended to realize the higher value in the foreseeable 
future (RFS, 1960, p. 8). 
The Building Societies Act 1960  
The collapse of the State Building Society in September 1959 hastened 
enhanced disclosure requirements in the Building Societies Act 1960 (BSA60) 
(Noguchi and Bátiz-Lazo, 2009).
8
 These requirements, although expressed in general 
terms, made the BSA60 more prescriptive than the CA48.  But there was still ample 
room for society directors and auditors to interpret whether certain accounting choices 
represented „fair presentation‟. There was, for instance, no specific guideline on 
depreciation, but disclosure was required of „… the method of arriving at the amount 
at which any office premises were shown in the society‟s Annual Return‟ (the Form 
A.R. 11).
9
 
The BSA60 also changed the audit objective in respect of building societies 
from „fraud detection‟ to „statement verification‟, with auditors required to comment 
on whether the financial statements presented „a true and fair view‟.  This shift 
aligned the treatment of societies with that of corporate bodies under the CA48 and  
was the culmination of a long process.  In the late nineteenth century building society 
fraud had been an important factor in the change of the primary audit objective in 
England from „statement verification‟ to „fraud detection‟ (Kitchen and Parker, 1980, 
p. 55; Chandler et al., 1993, p. 446).  But in the late 1920s, and especially the 1930s, 
opinion shifted to place greater emphasis on „statement verification‟ and this was 
reflected in the CA48 (Chandler et al., 1993, p. 452). The BSA60 also represented the 
first legislation to introduce the auditors‟ duty to report on internal control, preceding 
similar requirements in, for example, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 
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The financial statements of building societies from 1960 onwards were thus drafted 
under a different regime to those of 1959 and earlier. Whilst the BSA60 constituted a 
major piece of legislation for building societies, it also marked a key success for the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) which had made 
lengthy representations on behalf of its members to secure changes in building society 
audit requirements (Noguchi and Bátiz-Lazo, 2009). 
Other Accounting and Auditing Requirements 
Accountants readily accept that accounting principles allow scope for interpretation, 
but „[t]o be legal, interpretations may be in keeping with the spirit of the [accounting] 
standard or, at the other extreme, clearly stretch that spirit while remaining within the 
letter of the law‟ (Stolowy and Breton, 2004, p. 11).  In the absence of codified 
GAAP, historians of „creative accounting‟ compare and contrast transactions in a 
particular organization with practices in similar organizations in order to determine 
whether a group of transactions should be considered as „fair presentation‟, 
manipulation or fraud (e.g., Arnold, 1991). 
A number of sources other than legislation could have impacted on the practices 
of building societies. The ICAEW‟s Taxation and Financial Relations Committee, 
formed in 1942, issued „Recommendations on Accounting Principles‟.  The new 
building societies legislation, and its role in it, led the ICAEW to issue its first 
auditing publication, a booklet entitled „Audits of Building Societies‟ (ICAEW, 
1960).  This was concerned mainly with the system of internal control and verification 
of mortgage advances.  Guidance on „window dressing‟ addressed liquidity, not 
capital, and specific guidance on fixed assets and capital was lacking. 
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Another non-legislative source was the BSA‟s „Financial Accounting Procedures‟. 
These guidelines explicitly recognized that there were wide differences in accounting 
policies behind the apparent simplicity and uniformity in the financial statements of 
building societies. The „Procedures‟ considered „source[s] of great variability between 
building societies‟, such as labour costs within „Total Management Expenses‟,10 but 
did not address the depreciation of fixed assets. 
  The BSA60‟s statutory instruments left largely unaffected the choice of 
accounting policies by individual societies, and the ICAEW‟s Recommendations and 
audit guidance, and the BSA‟s „Financial Procedures‟ offered room for interpretation 
in areas such as the depreciation of fixed assets.  This apparent latitude created 
opportunities for creative accounting at the CPBS.  The next section sets out a brief 
history of the CPBS and discusses the growth in assets of the largest building societies 
to establish the need for creative accounting at the CPBS. 
 
THE CO-OPERATIVE PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY 
 
Brief Business History 
The CPBS (today Nationwide) was born as the Southern Co-operative Permanent 
Building Society in February 1884. The „Southern‟ prefix was removed ten years 
later. This London-based society was formed to enable depositors, particularly 
members of the co-operative movement, to buy their own homes (Ashworth, 1980, p. 
15; Cassell, 1984, p. 13). The Co-operative Congress, however, refused to give full 
backing to another financial institution developing alongside the banking arm of the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society (the CWS Bank - see Bátiz-Lazo, 2004; 2006), but 
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many leading and rank and file members of the co-operative movement joined the 
CPBS and some became its agents, either personally or through their retail societies.  
The CPBS also sought business elsewhere, notably amongst railway employees 
(Cassell, 1984, pp.  24-5). 
Mortgage advances of the CPBS and other building societies surged in the 
1920s and accelerated further during the 1930s (Humphries, 1987). This growth was 
accompanied by the emergence and increase in the numbers of both agency contracts 
and retail branches.
11
  By 1950 the combination of government policy antagonistic to 
private home ownership, the mortgage rate cartel,
12
 together with inflation and low 
savings rates, had led most societies to accumulate substantial liquid assets.  At this 
date about one-quarter of the CPBS‟s deposits was provided by the co-operative 
movement (Cassell, 1984, p. 86).  Further growth followed the 1951 return of a 
Conservative government, more sympathetic to private home ownership. 
Building society advances grew from 27 per cent of total mortgage 
transactions in 1920 to 38 per cent in 1936, to 50 per cent in 1958 (Cleary, 1965, p. 
282).  Growth among the societies was uneven.  By 1958, the top five societies 
accounted for £1.029 billion in assets, 43 per cent of the total assets for all 755 
societies,
13
 and were growing at double the rate of those of all other societies.  Most 
of this growth was organic, with little due to amalgamations with smaller societies, as 
the larger societies appear to have been more effective at capturing market share in 
the expanding retail mortgage market (Bátiz-Lazo and Billings, 2007).  The largest 
five societies plus the Alliance Building Society maintained annual average growth in 
mortgage assets of 13 per cent per year from 1950 to 1967 (Table 2, Panel A), during 
which time mortgage assets averaged 83 per cent of total assets of these societies. 
 [Insert Table 2 around here] 
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 Growth in the CPBS‟s mortgage assets during the 1950s exceeded the average for 
the top five societies (Cassell, 1984, p. 72; Table 2, Panel B).  It peaked at 24 per cent 
in 1958, when the CPBS amalgamated with the Scottish Amicable Building Society 
(SABS), the largest Scottish society, which had assets of £22.5 million and 42,658 
shareholders (14 per cent and 11 per cent of those of the combined entity 
respectively).  After yields on gilt-edged securities reached 7 per cent in September 
1957, the SABS‟s reserves of £997,792 at December 1957 were exceeded by the 
unrealized loss of £1.5 million on its investment holdings.
14
 Deposit withdrawal 
notices followed publication of these figures, and amounted to £2.5 million by 23 
April 1958, but most were cancelled after the merger was announced.
15
 
Even before the SABS amalgamation, the CPBS had drawn the attention of 
managers of the Woolwich Equitable (WEBS), who appeared to believe that its 
capital position was under pressure and that non-recurring items flattered profits:  
The General Manager submitted orally to the Board a report on certain 
features of the Annual Report of the Co-operative Permanent Society for 
1957.  Reference was made, inter alia, to the small revenue surplus for the 
year, the low reserve ratio and an increase over the year in the extent of 
appreciation of Stock Exchange Securities shown in the Balance Sheet which 
apparently arose from investment transactions during the year, including the 
taking into the Profit of a capital surplus of £262,170 on investments realised 
during the year.
16 
 WEBS directors returned to this theme a few months later, suggesting that the 
combination of organic growth and absorption of small societies had stretched the 
CPBS when they: 
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noted that since 1939 [to 1957, the] transfers of engagements to the Co-
operative Permanent had amounted to £6.1m (including £3.6m of the Exeter 
Benefit [1956] ), compared to £294,000 for Halifax and £220,000 for 
Woolwich.  There has been a marked rise in the management expenses ratio of 
the Co-operative Society over the period …17 
Soon after the SABS amalgamation the CPBS was involved in a public 
exchange during its bid for the Sheerness and Gillingham Society, the sector‟s first-
ever contested amalgamation.
18
  After H. V. Wiles, chairman of the Hastings and 
Thanet Society, the original bidder, questioned publicly whether the CPBS, then the 
third largest society in terms of assets, would achieve trustee investment status, the 
CPBS responded that it „would qualify for trustee status within the set time‟.19 W.W. 
Wetherhill, general manager of the Hastings, considered the CPBS‟s intervention 
„unsolicited and unwarranted‟, but Herbert Ashworth, CPBS general manager, 
declared that it „was justified by the strong reserve position and the well spread assets 
of the Sheerness society‟.20  After the Leek and Moorlands (LMBS) also made an 
offer for the Sheerness, the Hastings raised its offer and won control over the £3 
million in total assets and 8,000 members.
21
 
The Importance of Capital and Trustee Investment Status in Building Societies 
How then did this period of high growth affect societies‟ reserve ratios?  From 
1959 to 1967 „gross‟ reserve ratios averaged 3.8 per cent and „net‟ reserve ratios (i.e. 
after adjusting for unrealized profits or losses on investments) averaged 3.5 per cent 
for the top five societies and the Alliance (Table 1).  The net reserve ratios for the 
Alliance (2.5 per cent in 1959 and 2.9 per cent in 1960) and the CPBS (2.3 per cent in 
1959 and 2.7 per cent in 1960) stand out as relatively weak (Table 1, Panel B).  Assets 
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of these societies had grown particularly rapidly between 1950 and 1958 (Alliance: 
128 per cent and CPBS: 166 per cent - Table 2, Panel B). These two, and the smaller 
LMBS, had enjoyed high rates of asset growth since 1945 (Cleary, 1965, p. 252).  The 
BSA60 was enacted in June 1960 and at the CPBS‟s financial year end on 31 
December its reserves ratios remained below those of other large societies (Table 1).  
The CPBS‟s directors were closely associated with the virtues of an „adequate‟ 
level of reserves.  C.J. Dunham, CPBS‟s President from 1959 and a BSA Council 
member since 1950, became BSA Chairman in 1961.
22
 Close links between the BSA 
Council and the CPBS dated from the appointment of Arthur Webb, then CPBS‟s 
Secretary, to the BSA Executive in 1903. Webb joined the CPBS in 1892 (when total 
assets were £25,000), became managing director in 1928 (when total assets were £7 
million), Chairman in 1939 (when total assets were £30 million) and retired from the 
BSA Executive in 1946 and the CPBS Board in 1951 (when total assets were £66 
million).  Webb „constantly urged the desirability of societies maintaining a 10 per 
cent reserve fund, and whenever he spoke his views merited attention‟ (Price, 1959, p. 
381).  The CPBS was among the first societies to be granted trustee investment status 
in June 1959 and for reputational reasons the CPBS‟s directors would have been 
reluctant to put at risk this status, which was dependent on maintenance of a 
satisfactory capital position and perceived as a hallmark of prestige as well as giving 
potential for competitive advantage.  Loss of such status would have foreclosed 
growth opportunities and been regarded as a strong negative signal on the Society‟s 
management capabilities. 
Other societies also associated themselves with the importance of strong 
reserve ratios.  In the mid-1950s the Halifax, the largest society, experienced internal 
conflict over the issue, which cost it growth to the benefit of other societies, and led to 
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that society‟s temporary departure from the BSA (Barrow, 2006, pp. 38-49).  The 
Halifax‟s conservative attitude to reserves and liquidity was long-standing (Hobson, 
1953, pp. 129-130; Barrow, 2006, pp. 23-24).  Societies such as the Bristol and West 
had traditionally placed a high priority „on the maintenance of healthy reserve and 
liquidity ratios, and there was never any question that growth would be allowed to 
diminish either‟ (Harvey, 1988, p. 258). 
In his annual report for 1960 the CRFS attempted to raise awareness among 
depositors and the general public of the good business and sound financial standing of 
designated societies, cautioning investors to guard against societies „of doubtful 
financial standing, and ... to enquire whether [a society] has been designated as one in 
which trustees may deposit trust funds‟.23  The challenge for the CPBS was clear and 
the following section details its responses. 
 
THE CPBS‟S RESPONSE TO THE HOUSING AND HOUSE PURCHASE ACT 
1959 
 
Controlled Growth, 1959-63 
By 1959 the Society‟s directors had decided to curb its expansion.  A policy of 
restraint was announced at that year‟s Annual General Meeting and reported in the 
Building Societies Gazette: „In presenting the society‟s remarkable figures for 1958 - 
total assets have now reached £204,522,500 - it was emphasised [by Dunham, 
deputising for H.L. Score, the President] that the society‟s policy was one of 
controlled expansion‟.24  The significance of the new policy was evident to some 
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observers: „The Co-operative must build up its reserves, for it would not wish to 
jeopardise the prospect of trustee status under the government‟s housing bill.‟25 
 The period of controlled growth was initially expected to last a couple of years,
26
 
but the need to maintain trustee investment status required that it continue for longer 
than anticipated.  The CPBS relaxed its period of restraint in 1963, when annual 
growth of mortgage assets returned to double-digit rates and the net reserve ratio rose, 
to remain well above 3 per cent.  Several measures had been taken during this period: 
branch network expansion was halted; a £500 ceiling was imposed on new advances, 
at a time when the average mortgage loan in the U.K. was £1,112, virtually the same 
as the CPBS‟s own average loan of £1,139 (RFS, 1961, p. 2; CPBS Annual Return, 31 
December 1960); and the flow of new business and commission payments was curbed 
by terminating the contracts of more than 1,000 agents.  Branch numbers fell a little 
from 119 in 1958, only climbing back to 120 in 1964 (Cassell, 1984, p. 121).  A major 
review of strategy found that half of the 1,159 remaining agencies in 1963 generated 
deposits amounting to less than £2,000. The Society replaced those agents with 
employees and moved to a branch structure wherever possible (Cassell, 1984, pp. 82-
3).
27
  The success of the self-restraint policy was reflected in mortgage asset growth of 
158 per cent between 1958 and 1967 for the CPBS, compared to an average for the 
major societies of 208 per cent (Table 2, Panel B). 
Improving the Reserves Ratio, 1960 
The longer-term success of the controlled growth policy was not assured in 1960 
when the Society‟s directors concluded that it might be insufficient to allow the 
reserve requirement to be met.  The result was that the Revenue and Appropriation 
Account for 1960 showed three items which lifted the net reserves ratio: the sale and 
leaseback of a property involving a related party, changes in the basis of depreciation, 
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and the release of a taxation provision.  We now describe these three areas in turn and 
in the next section discuss them in greater detail. 
 A „Surplus on the sale of premises‟ of £424,484 was recorded in a transaction 
with the Co-operative Insurance Society (CIS), whereby the CPBS sold and leased 
back its head office (New Oxford House) and eight retail branch premises, all of 
which „stood in the books below their present worth‟.28  These freehold properties 
were transferred to the CIS for £500,000 and the CPBS entered into a 99 year 
agreement to lease them back, with the option to repurchase at no more than 10 per 
cent above the sale price.  The freehold of the head office was, indeed, bought back 
after a short interval (Cassell, 1984, p. 80).
29
  The second item recorded in the 
Revenue and Appropriation Account was a drop of £71,288 in the total charge for 
depreciation and the third item was the transfer to the Society‟s General Reserve of a 
balance of £255,716 described as an „Amount set aside for Future Taxation‟.  The 
Finance Committee: 
had been impressed by the argument that if the whole of the £53,145 required 
by the depreciation formula were provided, it would no longer be possible for 
the society to give an assurance that a net reserve ratio of 2.5 per cent would 
have been attained whether or not New Oxford House had been sold or, 
alternatively, whether or not the basis of provision for income tax had been 
changed. They had therefore reached the conclusion that is was desirable for 
all adjustments already agreed by the Board to be made so that the accounts 
would indicate a net reserve ratio of 2.677 per cent. 
[The Board were advised, however, that] since the Committee had considered 
the accounts, the Auditors had decided that it would be necessary for a note to 
appear on the Revenue and Appropriation Account if no depreciation were 
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provided on freehold premises in 1960. The Board was informed that, if an 
amount of up to £13,000 were provided on freehold premises, the note would 
not be needed, and it would still be possible to give the assurance mentioned 
above.
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 The Minutes of the Board and of the Finance Committee detailed neither the 
depreciation formula nor the calculations supporting the difference between the 
£53,145 required by the formula, the £13,000 charge acceptable to the auditors, and 
the actual charge for depreciation on premises of £24,254 shown in the Form A.R. 11 
for 1960. 
 The combined effect of these three measures was to raise the net reserve ratio 
of the CPBS to 2.7 per cent in 1960 (Table 1, Panel B), above the required minimum 
of 2.5 per cent. These actions proved timely, as continued growth in mortgage 
advances for the movement as a whole after 1959-60 reduced the reserve ratios of 
many societies, although not for the largest, all of whose net reserve ratios remained 
above 3 per cent (Table 1, Panel B).  By 1963 some other societies were near the point 
of having to decide between continued growth and loss of trustee investment status or 
maintenance of this status with slower growth (Cleary, 1965, p. 258), a dilemma 
which the CPBS had already addressed.
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DISCUSSION 
 
Creative Accounting at the CPBS 
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The definition of „creative accounting‟ is much debated.  Clarke et al. (2003, pp. 25-
31), for example, stress the inadequacies of contemporary GAAP with particular 
reference to the Australian context.  The parallel with this case is the ease with which 
the CPBS was able to shift from a position of likely non-compliance with the 
regulatory requirements to compliance, suggesting that prevailing GAAP were 
sufficiently loose to allow a wide range of accounting outcomes.  Alternatively this 
may imply that the CPBS‟s creative accounting was not unusual, but we have found 
no evidence to support this view, and will argue that the environment in which 
building societies operated created strong incentives for all parties to accept the 
CPBS‟s situation. 
Accounting literature distinguishes between „real‟ and „accruals‟ aspects of 
creative accounting i.e. decisions reflecting economic decisions (such as cutting 
discretionary expenditure or changing the timing of particular transactions) and 
accounting decisions (e.g., relating to depreciation or provisioning) (Stolowy and 
Breton, 2004, p. 24).  In the CPBS‟s case, the three main elements, with both real and 
accruals aspects, allowed the Society to report an improved capital position. 
The Property Sale and Leaseback 
This transaction had most significant immediate impact on the capital ratio, 
generating a £424,000 surplus compared to the £71,000 total reduction in the annual 
depreciation charge, but the latter would have had a significant cumulative impact 
over time.  The counterparty to the transaction, the CIS, was owned jointly by the Co-
operative Wholesale Society and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, both of 
whom nominated representatives to the CPBS‟s board from the mid-1940s to the mid-
1960s (Cassell, 1984, pp. 65 and 86). 
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The interpretation of this transaction most favourable to the CPBS is that it 
was able to crystallize a rise in property values without losing control of the properties 
concerned, when it was known that a straightforward revaluation would have been 
unacceptable.  This might be considered reasonable had the transaction been 
undertaken on „arms-length‟ terms i.e. the price paid by the CIS was that which an 
independent buyer would have paid and the leaseback rentals were at a market level.  
Unfortunately, the available evidence does not allow us to say whether this was the 
case. A less favourable interpretation is that the transaction simply represented 
„warehousing‟ of these assets with a related party  until the CPBS was in a position to 
exercise the buy-back option.  However interpreted, this was an unusual transaction - 
we have not found evidence of any comparable transaction among the larger societies, 
but, unlike the CPBS, they did not need such a transaction.  The CPBS was also 
unusual in that its roots in the co-operative movement provided a natural counterparty. 
Fixed Asset Reporting and Depreciation 
It is not possible to judge what an appropriate depreciation charge for the 
CPBS would have been - to do so would require detail of the composition and 
condition of fixed assets, for example the balance between freehold and leasehold 
properties and the maintenance or obsolescence of equipment.  We examined the 
Forms A.R. 11 for the big six societies and the LMBS for the ten years to 1960.  
Analyses of fixed asset totals and depreciation charges are either not provided at all in 
the Forms A.R. 11, or, if provided, on bases which are not obviously comparable 
across the different societies, but it is possible to make some comparisons over time 
and across societies.  Table 3 shows the societies‟ effective depreciation rates and 
reveals considerable variations from society to society, and from year to year for some 
societies.  The Halifax depreciation charges were round sum figures, typically 
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£50,000 per year.  The Leeds Permanent charged no depreciation, but in the years 
1958-60 recorded significant expenses for „re-equipping and renovating head office 
and branches‟ and in the years 1959 and 1960 expensed motor vehicles - we treat 
these items as „depreciation‟ in the table.  In keeping with its cautious attitudes, the 
Halifax‟s depreciation policy appears relatively conservative. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
These findings imply that there was little consensus on depreciation among 
large societies.  The CPBS‟s changed treatment of depreciation, although material in 
its overall impact on the financial statements, was arguably not out of line with the 
practice of other societies, and indeed more conservative than some.  The CPBS‟s 
depreciation charge in 1959 appears to have been relatively high by comparison to 
other major societies and also its own recent standards, so the reduced charge in 1960 
could be argued to have aligned it more closely with other societies. 
In deciding the charge for depreciation the CPBS‟s directors were also acting 
upon the advice of the auditors, and the Board Minutes of 19 January 1961 
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suggested that the auditors had discussed fully the question of depreciation, and thus 
auditors and directors could therefore claim that the working lives of the buildings had 
been properly assessed and that „… correct principles had been acted upon, and that 
the provision made in the accounts appears to be reasonable and sufficient‟ (de Paula, 
1957, p. 99).  The depreciation decision could also have been defended on the grounds 
of materiality in the overall context of the financial statements. With reserves of 
£6,418,160 and „Office Premises and Equipment‟ of £3,683,959 in 1959, the 
difference between the £13,000 charged and the £53,145 required by the depreciation 
formula could be regarded as immaterial.   
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Directors and auditors could argue that they followed „best practice‟ in 1960 
(as described by de Paula, 1957, pp. 98 and 145), as depreciation was charged on 
freehold properties, albeit a lower amount than previously.  Faced with the 
impossibility of estimating the working life of fixed assets that were actively 
maintained, and largely ignoring the ICAEW‟s Recommendations IX and VX, the 
joint-stock clearing banks, with their much larger high street branch networks, chose 
not to depreciate freehold property at all (Capie and Billings, 2001, p. 238). Perks 
(1977, pp. 177-81) claims the situation was similar at building societies in the early 
1970s.  Pack (1959) argued that, as building societies were subject „to the burden of a 
true and fair view‟ (p. 864), they should revalue office premises annually.  But the 
CRFS had signalled his unwillingness to accept revaluations of premises and it was 
not established practice among financial institutions - the first revaluation among the 
major banks did not occur until 1964 (Capie and Billings, 2001, p. 248). 
Overall, we conclude that, in exercising discretion in changing depreciation 
policy, the CPBS changed an aspect of its financial statements in which: a) „best 
practice‟ was not well-established; b) disclosures were variable; c) the Society had 
appeared previously to make greater provision for depreciation than some other large 
societies; and d) it would be difficult for the auditors to form a judgement as to the 
appropriateness of the charge made. 
Taxation 
The uncertainties associated with taxation have contributed to creative 
accounting in other organisations (see e.g., Arnold, 1991, and Napier, 1990).  The tax 
reserve „Amount set aside for Future Taxation‟ was identified as a pre-printed caption 
on the Form A.R. 11 only in the years 1959 and 1960 and appears to relate to changes 
in the basis of Income Tax in 1958.  Other specific taxation provisions shown in the 
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Form were for Income Tax and Profits Tax. We examined the other societies‟ 
balances on this reserve at the end of 1959 and 1960.  For four of these (Alliance, 
Abbey, LMBS, WEBS), the balance was nil in both years.  Halifax had year-end 
balances of £770,000 and nil in 1959 and 1960 respectively and Leeds Permanent 
£763,000 and £892,500 in these two years.  Although the CPBS‟s capital ratio 
benefited from release of this reserve, its elimination was not obviously out of line 
with the treatment of other major societies. 
Creative Accounting in Other Societies 
We do not claim that the CPBS was alone in its practice of creative 
accounting, although our examination of the Forms A.R. 11 of the major societies 
revealed no apparently obvious examples.  But some transactions relating to 
investments could be considered to represent earnings management.  Some societies 
recorded significant realized profits on investments and write-downs of investment 
values in various years.  The timing of investment disposals could represent „real‟ 
earnings management and the write-downs „accruals‟ earnings management, with 
both classes of transaction at the discretion of management. 
Acceptance of the CPBS’s Creative Accounting 
In the case of the CPBS creative accounting achieved its objective - the 
desired regulatory status was maintained.  There was clear intent to use specific 
changes in accounting practice or particular transactions to ensure compliance with 
the capital requirements, but the question remains why this failed to attract public 
attention or criticism. 
We have noted that the CPBS‟s financial weakness had been recognized by at 
least one other major society, but none of these societies made public comment on the 
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CPBS‟s difficulties, although the Hastings society had criticized the CPBS in the 
context of the battle for the Sheerness.  Given the nature of the movement it is 
unlikely that other major societies would have believed they could have gained from 
publicly discrediting the CPBS.  The societies had struggled to secure the prize of 
trustee investment status.  The failure of one of the largest societies to meet the 
requirements for this would have been damaging for the movement as a whole and 
arguably would have discredited the new regulation.  From a commercial point of 
view, other societies may have judged it better to have a weak competitor, which, 
indeed, conceded growth to them during its period of controlled expansion, rather 
than to shake confidence in the movement. 
The movement has had a long-standing tradition for the rescue of societies 
suffering from financial weakness or scandal by merger with larger societies.
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During the 1950s the CPBS had „rescued‟ two societies, the substantial SABS, 
seventeenth largest society (BSA Yearbook 1957), and the much small Exeter Benefit 
(with assets of £3.4 million versus the CPBS‟s £123.4 million at the end of 1955).  
But at the end of 1960 the CPBS was the third largest society, and there would have 
been considerable obstacles to its merger with another large society - its financial 
position, the co-operative movement links and issues such as the overlap of branch 
networks and dealing with the large number of agents.  To have drawn attention to the 
problems of a society „too big to fail‟ would have created real difficulties for the 
movement. 
In the absence of documentary evidence we are obliged to speculate as to why 
the CPBS‟s creative accounting did not attract the attention of the regulator 
responsible for the protection of shareholders and other depositors.  It is possible that 
the measures taken by the CPBS were accepted by the CRFS as a „quid pro quo‟ for 
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the CPBS‟s rescues of the SABS and the Exeter.  There would also have been 
embarrassment for the CRFS in criticising the CPBS, or even withdrawing its trustee 
investment status so soon after it was granted.  An extreme outcome could have been 
a „run‟ on the Society, which would not have benefited the regulator or other 
societies, and undermined the new regulatory regime and discredited the movement.  
This could have led to disruption of the provision of mortgage finance and the 
housing market, and possible damage to the co-operative movement.  The CRFS may 
therefore have hoped for the outcome that transpired - that the procedures adopted by 
the CPBS would allow it to „buy time‟, and coupled with the slowdown in its asset 
growth, the Society was able to improve its reserves ratio. 
Possible Audit Report Qualification and the Auditors’ Relationship with the CPBS 
The question arises as to whether the auditors‟ report on CPBS should have 
been qualified. Prior to the regulatory changes in 1959-60, auditors would qualify 
building society accounts based only on evidence of fraud or deceit, that is, when 
there were specific transactions relating to wealth transfers between stakeholders 
outside the letter of the law. The BSA60 required auditors of building societies to 
state, by way of a note to the Revenue and Appropriation Account or a letter to the 
CRFS, any items affected in every material respect by either (a) transactions of an 
exceptional or non-recurrent nature; or (b) by any change in the basis of accounting.
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Financial reports (i.e. Forms A.R. 11) of the top five building societies in the period 
1951 to 1970 were often accompanied by notes or letters regarding extraordinary 
matters, but none criticised or otherwise disagreed with the directors of these 
societies.  We have already noted the wide variations in the practices of asset 
depreciation in financial institutions, and it is debatable whether auditors of building 
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societies might have been expected to draw attention to changes in depreciation 
formulae. 
In this period: „Societies were audited by local accountants with whom they 
had connections and a relationship of trust‟.35  The Society‟s auditors were both 
partners in the firm Edward Myers, Clark & Co., which continued to provide its 
auditors until after 1970.
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  By 1960 the auditors had known the Society for some 
years and would have been aware of the integrity of the Board and of the long-term 
steps already taken to reduce growth to allow capital reserves to build up to ensure 
compliance with the minimum net reserve requirement.   
Audit fees were not separately disclosed in the Annual Returns, so it is not 
possible to comment on fee dependency, but later evidence suggests that audit fees 
were a very small proportion of total management expenses (Perks, 1977, pp. 111-
112). Nor do we have any evidence as to whether the auditors undertook other types 
of business for the CPBS which may have exposed them to conflicts of interest.
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It is unclear whether qualifications resulting from doubtful depreciation 
practices were widespread or whether such qualifications would have been regarded 
as serious.  Kettle (1954b, p. 277) cites an auditor‟s report describing improper 
depreciation of fixed assets as an exemplar of the consequences of obscure 
qualifications and empirical evidence has shown mixed results depending on the 
nature of the qualification and whether or not it was anticipated (Ball et al., 1979, p. 
27; Clinch, 1983, p. 143; Craswell, 1986, p. 32). Inconsistencies in the requirements 
of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule Nine of the CA48 were identified as sources of 
difficulty in distinguishing auditors‟ comments (i.e. amplifications) from outright 
qualifications (Kettle, 1954a, p. 250). 
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 Auditor performance must be interpreted in its historical context and this case 
arose in a period before the development of comprehensive auditing guidelines and 
standards.  The CPBS‟s auditors were in a difficult position and would have had to 
rely heavily on their judgement in forming their opinion.  There was a new audit 
regime, the ICAEW‟s guidance on building society audits did not address the aspects 
at issue, and the ICAEW‟s Recommendations on Accounting Principles and the 
BSA‟s guidelines were not binding and had failed to produce uniformity among 
societies or other financial institutions.  The concept of materiality, although explicitly 
recognized by auditors in the 1950s, remained ill-defined, not featuring in audit 
textbooks until the 1970s (Matthews, 2006, pp. 125-6). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has taken an historical perspective to analyse managerial discretion in 
financial services organizations in the context of a changing regulatory environment 
by combining secondary sources with original archival material.  The case of the 
CPBS highlights problems in accounting for fixed assets, materiality and, more 
generally, the nature of the audience for financial statements and to whom auditors are 
accountable. The case offers unusual insight into accounting practice where there was 
a material effect on the reported position of a financial intermediary, where 
accounting for fixed assets had been a minor consideration. 
This paper is not a comprehensive study of financial reporting practices among 
building societies, but the CPBS case does not appear to be representative of creative 
accounting amongst other large building societies.
38
  But there is perhaps some irony 
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that a mutual building society should have used techniques of accounting 
manipulation given the apparent nostalgia with which such institutions have been 
viewed in the current financial crisis.  However, we have shown how, as in other 
sectors, financial reporting interacts with the external environment.  We have also 
extended the creative accounting literature by demonstrating that practice varied in 
important areas of financial reporting in the relatively neglected mutual sector, outside 
the CA48 reporting framework, and that this provided opportunities for creative 
accounting.  A notable difference between this and other British cases of creative 
accounting is the association of lack of transparency and creative accounting with the 
use of hidden reserves.  This was true in companies generally before CA48, and until 
at least 1970 in banking, but the CPBS case was relatively transparent and involved 
no use of hidden reserves. 
The motivations for accounting manipulation in this case do not fall wholly 
conveniently within usual classifications.  In Stolowy and Breton‟s framework the 
target of manipulation was a regulatory ratio to prevent a loss of status which would 
not have benefited „shareholders‟ or other depositors due to the absence of equity 
shareholders.  The sale and leaseback related party transaction and depreciation 
changes appear to have been designed to overcome the inability to use revaluation to 
improve the regulatory ratio.  These fall into Stolowy and Breton‟s category of 
„specially-designed transactions‟ (2004, p. 12), as well as the practices discussed by  
Clarke et al. (2003, p. 31).  Another perspective is to place the case in the context of 
Clinch‟s „bond covenant hypothesis‟ (1983, p. 141). This view suggests that 
covenants will affect management choice of accounting methods since managers will 
seek to avoid the costs of violating restrictions. Such costs may relate to the 
renegotiation of a debt contract, possible bankruptcy arising from technical default, 
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or, in this instance, the costs which would likely have arisen from the loss of a 
particular regulatory status, that of being eligible for investments by trustees.  
The case also highlights difficulties in interpreting problems in a service 
business. If a firm in a sector such as manufacturing, transport or mining faced a 
situation of excessive growth, management‟s shortcomings would become evident as 
either inventory would grow, plant would remain idle, fixed assets would be poorly 
maintained or replaced at the wrong time and the audit fee would increase 
substantially. In a service firm stakeholders are obliged to place greater reliance on 
the financial accounts and hence consistency and transparency are important. 
Financial intermediaries can signal that there might be problems ahead by, for 
example, changes in provisions or in dividend policies.  The CPBS signalled the end 
of a period of high growth and the start of one of consolidation, but did not articulate 
fully the implications of this change. 
A broader implication of the article is that during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
directors of building societies, and perhaps even banks, had limited regard for 
financial considerations when making expansion and capital expenditure decisions. 
But accounting for fixed assets was to become much more important to the history of 
financial service organizations because „tax policy and depreciation profoundly 
influenced the timing of when companies acquired large computers, which were 
capital-intensive investments‟ (Cortada, 2004, p. 23).  This indicates that future 
studies on capital-intensive investments in U.K. retail finance (such as 
computerization and retail branch network expansion in the 1960s and 1970s) will 
need to explore the interaction between strategic and financial considerations in the 
selection and timing of those investments.
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TABLE 1 
GROSS AND NET RESERVES, 1950-67, SELECTED YEARS 
Year Abbey Alliance Co-operative Leeds Woolwich Halifax 
 
Average 
 National  Permanent Permanent Equitable   
        
Panel A - Gross Reserves = Total reserves / total assets % 
        
1950 5.4 2.2 4.6 6.7 5.4 5.8 5.0 
1955 3.9 2.1 3.2 5.3 4.2 4.5 3.9 
1958 3.6 2.7 2.7 5.1 4.3 3.5 3.6 
1959 3.7 3.1 2.9 5.2 4.3 3.6 3.8 
1960 3.6 3.5 3.4 5.4 4.0 3.5 3.9 
        
 Average 
1959-67 
3.5 3.3 3.3 5.0 3.8 3.6 3.8 
        
Panel B - Net reserves / net total assets % 
        
1959 3.6 2.5 2.3 5.2 3.2 3.6 3.4 
1960 3.2 2.9 2.7 5.2 2.9 3.5 3.4 
Average 
 1959-67 3.4 3.0 3.1 4.7 3.4 3.6 3.5 
 
Panel C - Other information 
        
Established 1944 1863 1884 1848 1847 1853 1857 
Incorporated 1944 1879 1884 1875 1875 1875 1878 
Achieved  
national  
branch  
coverage 
1948 1959 1952 1961 1948 1937 1951 
 
Source: Building Societies Yearbook, 1950 to 1968 and authors‟ calculations. 
Note: Financial year-ends: Leeds Permanent and Woolwich Equitable: 30 September; 
Abbey National, Alliance, Co-operative Permanent: 31 December; and Halifax: 31 
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January. Abridged balance sheets were reported in the Building Societies Yearbook 
published in the following June, that is, the same year in which the Halifax closed its 
books.  The Abbey National was created in 1944 through the union of two large and 
long standing societies, the Abbey Road (established 1874) and the National 
(established 1849). 
 
TABLE 2 
ASSET GROWTH AT THE MAJOR BUILDING SOCIETIES, 1950-67 
Year  Abbey  Alliance Co-operative Leeds Woolwich Halifax Average 
   National    Permanent Permanent Equitable     
        
Panel A – Mortgage asset growth per year (%) 
        
Average 12.7 14.5 12.5 12.2 11.4 14.2 12.9 
        
Panel B - Cumulative mortgage asset growth, various periods (%) 
        
1950-1967 568 730 585 448 442 534 551 
1950-1958 108 128 166 92 87 91 112 
1958-1967 221 263 158 185 190 231 208 
1960-1965 53 69 37 50 52 55 53 
        
Source: as Table 1. 
 
 TABLE 3 
EFFECTIVE DEPRECIATION RATES (%), 1951-60 
Year Abbey 
National 
Alliance Co-operative 
Permanent 
Halifax Leeds 
Permanent 
Woolwich 
Equitable 
Leek and 
Moorlands 
Minimum Maximum Unweighted 
average 
1951 2.18 2.75 2.84 10.19 0 2.49 0.98 0 10.19 3.06 
1952 2.11 3.23 3.83 9.99 0 2.66 1.91 0 9.99 3.39 
1953 2.19 3.22 3.15 9.13 0 4.42 2.45 0 9.13 3.51 
1954 2.42 2.51 2.75 7.72 0 3.18 2.18 0 7.72 2.97 
1955 2.85 2.13 3.31 6.89 0 2.38 2.29 0 6.89 2.84 
1956 2.81 2.16 3.32 6.40 0 2.57 2.88 0 6.40 2.88 
1957 2.55 1.36 3.20 5.42 0 1.89 3.03 0 5.42 2.49 
1958 3.31 1.20 3.19 n/a 7.87 2.99 2.47 1.20 7.87 3.50 
1959 2.98 1.24 4.11 9.23 6.09 2.39 3.48 1.24 9.23 4.22 
1960 3.06 0.97 2.24 3.97 4.88 2.80 3.18 0.97 4.88 3.01 
Average 2.64 2.08 3.19 7.66 1.88 2.78 2.49 1.88 7.66 3.25 
Source: authors‟ calculations from TNA, Forms A.R. 11. 
Note: The effective depreciation rate is expressed as a percentage, and calculated as the total charge for depreciation shown in the Revenue and 
Appropriation Account divided by the total year-end net book value for fixed assets shown in the Balance Sheet.  Year-end dates are as shown in 
Table 1.  n/a = Form A.R. 11 missing for this year. 
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6
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1984, p. 121). Agency numbers peaked at 3,165 in 1958, but many of these were not 
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12
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13
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14
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15
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16
 WEBSA, 1023/49, Board Minutes, „Co-operative Permanent Building Society‟, 18 
March 1958. 
17
 WEBSA, 1023/1249, Development Committee papers, „ “Notes on Statistics 
relating to Financial Structures” of Halifax, Co-operative Permanent and Woolwich‟, 
19 August 1958.  In 1939 the CPBS amalgamated with the Wellingborough 
Investment Building Society and its 5 offices and with 15 small societies from 1942-7 
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21
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22
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23
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24
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Italics added for emphasis. 
25
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26
 „Co-operative B.S. to Consolidate‟, The Times, 29 January 1959, p. 5. 
27
 The move to replace agents was not unique to the CPBS.  From 1948 there was 
growing realization amongst directors of building societies that retail branches 
„promised control, co-ordination and continuity in a way that commission agents, 
however special, could not‟ (Harvey, 1988, p.  257). As a result, national retail branch 
networks mushroomed during the 1960s and 1970s (Davies, 1981; Bátiz-Lazo and 
Billings, 2007). 
28
 CPBS, Confidential Minute Book, 27 October 1960. 
29
 Cassell‟s corporate history of the Nationwide cites a value of £550,000 for the sale 
and leaseback contract and makes no reference to the retail branches or the 
depreciation issue (1984, p. 80). Property sale and leaseback transactions, particularly 
by retailers with insurance companies as the typical counterparty, had become 
common in the 1930s.  Such transactions were preferable to overdraft or mortgage 
finance as a higher percentage of a property‟s market value could be realized.  They 
were widely used again in the 1950s as part of Britain‟s postwar takeover boom, 
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allowing companies to raise finance when the Capital Issues Committee still 
controlled capital-raising (Scott, 1996, pp. 52-3, 122). 
30
 CPBS, Minutes of the Board, 19 January 1961, 4.I.a. 
31
 The CRFS relaxed the reserve ratio requirement in 1964, requiring reserves of 2.5 
per cent for the first £100 million of assets, but reserves of only 2 per cent for assets 
above this.  In 1967 a committee chaired by Sir Charles Hardie recommended lower 
reserve ratios for larger societies, a suggestion which would have saved the CPBS 
much trouble had it been implemented earlier (Cassell, 1984, p. 81). New reserve 
requirements took effect in 1968 and remained unchanged until the mid-1980s 
(Boléat, 1986, pp. 57-8). 
32
 CPBS, Minutes of the Board, 19 January 1961, 4.Ia and 5.I. 
33
 This tradition has continued during the current financial crisis. 
34
 S.I. 1960 No. 1827, part 5 (a and b). 
35
 „Stricter Checks Pose Audit Problems for Small Building Societies‟, The Times, 12 
October 1978, p. 27. 
36
 The Annual Returns (Forms A.R. 11) show that J.A. McGilchrist CA became junior 
auditor in 1956 and J. Heaford FCA senior auditor in 1957 (TNA, FS 14/559) after J. 
B. Prentice FCA „… was compelled to resign the office of members‟ auditor which he 
had held for the past 17 years because of ill health‟ („Good Progress in Spite of 
Unfavourable Conditions‟, The Times, 3 March 1958, p. 17).  The partnership of 
Edward Myers, Clark & Co. dissolved in the early 1970s while the practice based at 
56/61 Moorgate (the last known address for  Heaford and  McGilchrist) was 
amalgamated with „one of the top twenty firms‟ (information supplied by Richard 
Driver, 2 February 2006).  
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37
 In the 1960s large auditing firms undertook consultancy work in the 
computerization of several societies including the CPBS, LMBS and WEBS (Bátiz-
Lazo and Wardley, 2007).   
38
 Archives for WEBS are available at Barclays Group Archives (Manchester) and 
those of Abbey National at the London Metropolitan Archives.  At the time of 
writing, the archives of the Halifax and Leeds Permanent were in storage and yet to be 
catalogued.  The Board of Alliance and Leicester plc has decided to keep closed its 
holdings of building societies‟ archives. 
